In what ways did the emergence of the British, French and German nation states during the nineteenth century shape attitudes to immigration?

The modern political system is made up of nation-states, each has its own understanding of the nation and citizenship that characterizes it from the rest. The state, or the nation-state, consist of citizens, as Aristotle puts it. However, both the ideas of the state and citizenship were under constant change throughout history due to changes the political structure, of the time, came through. During the times of Aristotle citizenship was associated with the polis, or the city-state, it was not until the eighteenth century that the idea of the nation emerged, and before that people were considered subjects and not citizens. It is interesting how the emergence of the nation-state was followed by the spread of immigration, specially that the Nineteenth century is regarded as the golden age of immigration. How did the emergence of the nation-state affect immigration? This paper will examine the nation-states of Britain, France and Germany in relation to immigration, it will begin by examining the ideas of citizenship and nationalism and then examine the attitudes of these three nation-states to immigrants.

To clarify the idea of citizenship, this paper brings to light the ideas of Agamben[1]  in distinguishing two areas of human existence, namely; zoe and bios. The former stands for the bare life, and the latter stands for the political life. Kiwan goes on further and clarifies Agamben’s ideas:

The relationship between these ideas may be articulated as follows: bio-power turns zoe into bios, through defining a realm of bare life. Bare life denotes at the most basic level - a living human being. [...] Resonating Foucault's idea, Agamben points out that the human is produced by the exclusion of the inhuman. The human denotes a political qualified form of life, or citizen. [...] The distinction between the human and the inhuman is drawn by means of the politicalization of natural life. [2]

These ideas provide us with an understanding of citizenship; being human does not necessarily means that someone is a citizen, it is in the transformation of the zoe into bios through the process of politicalization that a human being can become a citizen, which is a process carried out by the sovereign authority which determines who is a citizen and who is in the ‘state of exception’, “The sovereign authority decides who can or cannot be members of a community, who can or cannot be politically qualified citizens under the control of the juridical-political system.”[3] Granting citizenship to aliens is based on the state’s interests, as in Janoski’s example “The Roman and British Empires wanted to stabilize their holdings, and settler countries like Canada and the United States wanted to find people to work the land and control indigenous people. […] Other countries without such interests rely on blood descent or require immigrants to navigate a difficult maze.”[4]

Balibar quotes Bonald saying that “certain persons are in society without being of society.”[5] those people are the “others” whom citizens shape their national identity against; “It is the community itself that excludes, not only in the form of bureaucratic rules and procedures, but also in the form of a consensus of its members, which is itself more or less politically “motivated.” […] It is always the citizens, “knowing” and “imagining” themselves as such, who exclude from citizenship and who, thus, “produce” non-citizens in such a way as to make it possible for them to represent their own citizenship to themselves as a “common” belonging”.[6] Among those excluded, or among those in “the realm of bare life” in Agamben’s terms, are immigrants. An immigrant is someone who leaves his homeland and settles in another place, either temporarily or permanently, thus, an immigrant is a member of a specific community who settles in the land of another community that he doesn’t belong to; therefore, he doesn’t have the right to enjoy the rights that the people of that land enjoy. Immigration was not a new phenomenon, it has always existed throughout history, yet a defining characteristic of modern immigration is its massive scale, due to various factors: modern technology; the emergence of racial thinking; and the triumph of popular and national sovereignty.[7] The Nineteenth century consideration as the golden age of immigration, is due to the modern characteristic of immigration stated above. Yet it might be the golden age for those going to the new world -the U.S., but one would ask what was the attitude of France, Germany and Britain to those people? In the following the nationalisms of these three countries and their effects on immigration will be examined.

With the emergence of the nation-state, and the nation being an “imagined-community”, the attitudes and treatment of immigrants varied depending on the nation-state that the immigrant belonged to and the nation-state he or she settled or will settle in. What distinguishes each nation from the others is the style in which it is imagined.[8] “Nations”, Williams wrote, “far from being immanent in history, are historically and socially ‘produced’ and ‘constructed’”[9], the nation is a ‘figment of the sociological imagination’[10]. Therefore, each nation-state has its own conception of nationhood and citizenship and, consequently, its own conception of who can and cannot be a citizen of the community.

In theory, there’re two distinct types of nationalism; civic and ethnic nationalisms, the former based on the territoriality principle of citizenship; ius soli, and the latter based on descent principle of citizenship; ius sanguinis. ‘Civic nationalism is characterized by an emphasis on citizenship, individual rights, and obligations within a political community’, while ‘Ethnic nationalism have the emphasis placed upon shared myths of ancestry and historical memories, as well as common culture’. However, these two types ‘overlook the causes of emotional identification and enmity.’[11] Therefore, it is proper to analyse each nation-state and its history separately.

France, for example, is usually thought of as a model of ‘civic nationalism’.[12] However, somewhat it is true, yet this image is troublesome as it doesn’t depict the reality of the 19^th century France. It should be noted that there’re two nationalist traditions in France; revolutionary and reactionary traditions. The former tradition is usually associated with civic notions of nationalism, while the latter entertained elements that resemble cultural notions of nationalism.[13] However, even though the revolutionary tradition advocated civic notions of nationalism, there were also ethnocultural notions employed during revolutionary years.[14] “Elements of ethno-cultural exclusivity and xenophobia can be found even at the heart of the republican national project, coming to the surface whenever the republican elites were confronted with the concrete political realities of the nineteenth century such as war, immigration, or colonialism.”[15] Ethnic and Civic elements represented political interests of the time[16], economic and military interests of France introduced the 1889 French citizenship law which extended naturalization to second generation migrants, however, this law was not applied to everyone: ethnic principles during the colonial period were applied on some while not on others; Europeans had more chances to attain French citizenship, while Algerians were considered only French subjects.[17] Low population growth urged France to absorb more immigrants into its citizenry, yet most of those who were accepted were people from Latin and Catholic nations.[18] Therefore, conceiving France as based on “civic” model of nationalism undermines and turns a blind eye on historical instances which prove the opposite. Hence, it’s better to perceive nationalism as operating based on political motives as will be pointed out to below.

The same thing can be said about Germany. Which is mostly perceived as based on “ethnic” model of nationalism. Again, such generalization is troublesome. Perhaps it is worth quoting Alexandre Dumas’ words “All generalizations are dangerous, including this one.” Brubaker’s argument  that German nationalism is ‘ethnocultural’[19], though it is true, it undermines various historical instances where German nationalism can be associated with ‘civic’ notions of nationalism[20], these historical instances resemble varying political, and clash of, interests as many nationalists used both ethnic and civic notions based on their interests.[21] Throughout the eighteenth and until late nineteenth century Germany lacked a ‘state-driven process of nationalization’.[22] Therefore, the process of German nationalism initiated from below, constructed through a reliance on cultural notions advocated through voluntary associations of the public which also demanded civic rights.[23] However, with the transformation of nationalism from the cultural to the political sphere since 1848 revolution to the emergence of the Imperial German nation in 1858, a national association was formed where civic and ethnocultural notions of nationalism could be found.[24] Yet, nationalization decisions represent political interests, a simple example can be seen as Gosewinkel pointed out to a proposal to introduce ius soli principles in Alsace-Lorraine in order to counter the 1889 French citizenship law, yet such proposal was rejected because immigrants from Eastern Europe were relatively poor compared to those who immigrate to Germany from Western Europe. A similar attitude can be seen in Germany compared to that of France, where Danes and Belgians were assimilated and naturalized but not the Poles.[25]

Gosewinkel argues that this dichotomous approach to both France and Germany based on Ethnic/Civic nationalism is not appropriate. A proper understanding of the attitude of these states towards migrants should not be through the above-mentioned lenses, as they change depending on the political situation of a given time. France, Gosewinkel argues did not introduce ius soli principle until 1889 the reason behind is attributed to various factors, among them is to promote republican values after the revolution and also to increase the numbers of soldiers and workers during a time where industrial growth was threatened by falling population rates. Germany, meanwhile, was enjoying industrial growth as well and not just that but the population rate was increasing rapidly relative to that of France. “Thus, when economic and, especially, political motives and the particular interests at play in the two states are taken into account, we can see that the opposition between ius soli and ius sanguinis does not have such a close systematic and institutional link with a dominant conception of the nation. The legal principles functioned in a more instrumental way, in response to changing economic and demographic policy goals.”[26]

In contrast to France and Germany, Britain represents a different case. First of all, unlike France which inherited a unitary state and unlike Germany which became a federation of states, Britain is the union of various states together with allegiance to political institutions. Therefore, Britain is not a nationalism in the sense French or German nationalisms are. Rather, a British identity consists on institutions and symbols that identify as British.[27] This British identity, consisted on various nationalisms; English, Scottish, Welsh and, controversially, Irish nationalisms. This incubation of various nationalisms into one identity was exercised through the Parliament which represents the hallmark of this unionist state based on mutual co-existence.[28] However, similar to France and Germany, both ethnic and civic notions could be inferred to from the attitude of the British towards immigrants: Panayi introduced the term “Multicultural racism” to point out to the controversial attitude of the British towards immigrants. He argues that “over the last two centuries Britain has somehow emerged as a state in which racism remains endemic yet in which migrants and, more especially, their descendants, have often witnessed significant economic and social mobility.”[29] He argues that the structure of liberal democracy was the reason behind the co-existence of such two contradictory forces at the same time.[30] A striking example in support of Panayi’s argument can be seen in Feldman’s quotation of an MP who objected against the 1905 Aliens act.[31] This objection represents the various ideas that existed in Britain, and it presents a similarity with the German case introduced above that was rejected as it would give the chance for Jews and Poles to naturalize, however the objection in this case is in reverse and not one favoured by the state.

In Conclusion, what this paper tried to illustrate was that citizenship and nationality are constructed by political interests. This being the case, ascribing any nation to a specific type of nationalism risks undermining historical instance that doesn’t fit the ascription. This was illustrated by providing instances where the relation between the three subject nation-states and immigrants doesn’t fit the presupposed assumptions about each of these nation-states. It was not because France advocates civic notions of nationalism that it assimilated more migrants than Germany, if this is the case the fact that most Algerian’s were not granted citizenship undermines this view about France. Similar too, is the assimilation of the Danes and Belgians into Germany which pretty much undermines the ethnocultural view of Germany. The attitudes of these nations simply represent their political interests at the time, and so is true in the British case.

References

Agamben, Georgio, Beyond Human Rights, Open, (2008), p. 90-95

Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, (London: Verso, 2006)

Balibar, Étienne, Citizenship, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015)

Baycroft, Timothy, 'France: Ethnicity and the Revolutionary Tradition', in What is Nationalism, ed. Timothy Baycroft and Mark Howiston, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp.28-41.

Berger, Stefan, 'Germany: Ethnic Nationalism Par Excellence', in What is nationalism, ed. Timothy Baycroft and Mark Howiston, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp.42-60.

Bessel, Richard and Haake, Claudia, Removing Peoples: Forced Removal in the Modern World, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)

Brubaker, Rogers, Immigration, Citizenship and the Nation-State in France and Germany: A Comparative Historical Analysis, International Sociology 5 (1990), pp. 379-407.

Eastwood, David, 'Conclusion: from dynastic union to unitary State: The European Experience', in A union of multiple identities: the British Isles, c. 1750-c. 1850, ed. Brocliss, John, and David Eastwood, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), pp. 193-212.

Feldman, David, 'Was the Nineteenth Century a Golden Age for Immigrants? The Changing Articulation of National, Local and Voluntary Controls', in Migration Control in the North-Atlantic World, ed. Faron Weil and Andreas Fahrmeir, (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008), pp.167-177.

Gosewinkel, Dieter, 'Citizenship in Germany and France at the Turn of the Twentieth Century', in Citizenship and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Germany, ed. Geoff Eley and Jan Palmowski, (California: Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 27-39.

Gosewinkel, Dieter, 'Nation and Citizenship from the Late 19th Century Onwards: A Comparative European Perspective', European Parliament's Committee on Constitutional Affairs, (2008).

Janoski, Thomas, Ironies of Citizenship, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)

Jeismann, Michael, 'Nation, Identity and Enmity', in What is Nationalism, ed. Timothy Baycroft and Mark Howiston, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp.17-26.

Kiwan, Dina, Human Rights and Citizenship Education, (New York: Routledge, 2015)

Panayi, Panikos, An Immigration History of Britain: Multicultural Racism since 1800, (Harlow: Pearson, 2010.

Williams, Chris, 'The United Kingdom: British Nationalism during the Long Nineteenth Century', in What is Nationalism, ed. Timothy Baycroft and Mark Howiston, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp.272-292.

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[1] Georgio Agamben, Beyond Human Rights, Open, (2008), pp. 90-95 (p.93).

[2] Dina Kiwan, Human Rights and Citizenship Education, (New York: Routledge, 2015), p.42.

[3] Kiwan, p.44.

[4] Thomas Janoski, Ironies of Citizenship, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp.2-3.

[5] Étienne Balibar, Citizenship, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), p. 63.

[6] Balibar, p. 76.

[7] Richard Bessel and Claudia Haake B., Removing Peoples: Forced Removal in the Modern World, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 6

[8] Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, (London: Verso, 2006), p. 6.

[9] Chris Williams, 'The United Kingdom: British Nationalism during the Long Nineteenth Century', in What is Nationalism, ed. Timothy Baycroft and Mark Howiston, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp.272-292 (p. 274).

[10] Rogers Brubaker, Immigration, Citizenship and the Nation-State in France and Germany: A Comparative Historical Analysis, International Sociology 5 (1990), pp. 379-407 (p. 385).

[11] Michael Jeismann, 'Nation, Identity and Enmity', in What is Nationalism, ed. Timothy Baycroft and Mark Howiston, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp.17-26 (p. 17).

[12] Brubaker, p. 386.

[13] Timothy Baycroft, 'France: Ethnicity and the Revolutionary Tradition', in What is Nationalism, ed. Timothy Baycroft and Mark Howiston, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp.28-41 (pp. 29-33).

[14] Baycroft, p. 34.

[15] Baycroft, p. 40.

[16] Baycroft, p. 41.; Dieter Gosewinkel, 'Citizenship in Germany and France at the Turn of the Twentieth Century', in Citizenship and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Germany, ed. Geoff Eley and Jan Palmowski, (California: Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 27-39 (p. 33).

[17] Baycroft, p. 37.; Gosewinkel, p. 33.

[18] Gosewinkel, p. 35.

[19] Brubaker, p. 386.

[20] Gosewinkel, pp. 34-35.; Stefan Berger, 'Germany: Ethnic Nationalism Par Excellence', in What is nationalism, ed. Timothy Baycroft and Mark Howiston, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp.42-60 (p. 46).

[21] Berger, p. 58.

[22] Berger, p. 44.

[23] Berger, p. 44.

[24] Berger, p. 48.

[25] Gosewinkel, p. 34.

[26] Dieter Gosewinkel, 'Nation and Citizenship from the Late 19^th Century Onwards: A Comparative European Perspective', European Parliament's Committee on Constitutional Affairs, (2008), p. 7.

[27] David Eastwood, 'Conclusion: from dynastic union to unitary State: The European Experience', in A union of multiple identities: the British Isles, c. 1750-c. 1850, ed. Brocliss, John, and David Eastwood, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), pp. 193-212 (p. 195)

[28] Williams, p. 279; Eastwood, p. 196.

[29] Panikos Panayi, An Immigration History of Britain: Multicultural Racism since 1800, (Harlow: Pearson, 2010), p.316.

[30] Panayi, p. 295.

[31] David Feldman, 'Was the Nineteenth Century a Golden Age for Immigrants? The Changing Articulation of National, Local and Voluntary Controls', in Migration Control in the North-Atlantic World, ed. Faron Weil and Andreas Fahrmeir, (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008), pp.167-177 (p. 168).