Turkey-EU relations: from 2009 onwards
The
relationship between Turkey and the EU existed way before to the extent that it
can be traced with Turkey’s predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, though of course,
the nature of the relationship has totally changed from alleged anonymity to
positive engagement with the new Turkish Republic. The inclination of Turkey
towards the west through the policies of westernization and secularization that
Turkey followed since its inception, was materialized with the 1963 Ankara
Agreement between the European Economic Community (EEC) and Turkey, to
facilitate the accession membership of Turkey into the community. Fifty years
has passed and the membership goal set out by the Ankara Agreement is still far
from being a reality, this is still the case till today. To better understand
the causes of this setback this paper attempts to analyse the relationship
between Turkey and the EU since 2009 by taking the work of Eralp as a framework
in its analysis,[1] in
which Eralp emphasizes the importance of the time factor in the relationship
between the two parties. This factor is, in turn, influenced by the factor of
interaction which is crystalized by the temperament of the relations between
Turkey and the EU. In other words, when the interaction between Turkey and the
EU slows in term of time due to challenges that surface throughout the negotiations
process the relations between the both parties is likely to diverge.[2]
This paper argues, similar to Eralp, that governing with time processes (i.e.
meeting the negotiation criteria) is at times heralded by events that slow down
the governing of time processes due to various events that took place between the
period of 2009-2017 like which undermined any further progress towards the
completion of the negotiations.
The cumulative
stagnation in the relations since the opening of the accession talks made
solving the problems even harder between both parties. Following setbacks in
its relations with the EU, Turkey became more and more disenchanted and
sceptical towards any near future membership and in turn moving this
long-sought goal down the agenda of the Turkish authorities.[3]
This pattern is still persistent till today even though recent talks to upgrade
the Customs Union are being discussed. In regards to the EU, unilateral vetoes
against opening accession chapters with Turkey began to be routinized which in
turn show reluctance of influential member states to support Turkish membership.[4]
The Cyprus
issue remain until today an issue with little hope of resolving it. Recently,
however, in talks to upgrade the customs union between both parties, Turkey
accepted to open its ports to Cypriot vessels with the condition that doing so
Turkey does not declare the legitimacy of the Cypriot government. Yet, even under
such concessions, it is unwise to make any predictions whether such move by
Turkey would be welcomed by Cyprus in this regard, particularly when it vetoed
the opening of the first chapter regarding the customs union in the accession
negotiations in June 2006.[5]
Another major
issue in front of Turkey is the fulfilment of the Copenhagen political criteria
in the areas of democracy and human rights.[6]
Even in the talks of upgrading the customs union, if Turkey seeks eventual
accession into the EU membership, meeting the political criteria is
inescapable. Though earlier periods saw increased reforms process in turkey,
the period after 2010 saw a slow down in this process. Yet as Mütfüler-Baç makes it clear “The Turkish straying away from
political reforms is partly related to the mixed messages coming from the EU”.[7]
Furthermore, stagnations
between the two parties and also domestic events prevented the country from
going any further towards fulfilling these criteria.[8]
Despite of this, the Turkish government since the beginning of the accession
negotiations has implemented most of the criteria set by the European Council, yet
the Gezi events of 2013 and the Turkish government’s handling of the situation
was a setback in its relations with the EU, especially when in regards to chapter 22 which was meant to
be opened in June 2013“Germany grounded its veto [to launch the chapter]
inexplicitly on the Turkish government’s handling of the Gezi Park
demonstrations”.[9]
However, the rambunctious handling of time by both
parties in recent years is attributed to changing dynamics in both parties.
Recent events in the EU forced it to pay attention inwards altering EU’s
approach from neighboring countries from enlargement to fostering good
relations with the new Neighborhood policy. [10]
This caused a lack of commitment from the Turkish part in return in
regards to fulfilling the accession criteria.[11]
From what preceded above, the relations between Turkey
and the EU since 2009 were even more complicated than it has ever been before.
Various events played important role (i.e. governing of time) in slowing down
the process of governing with time. The temporality of the period between 2009
and 2016 could be argued to have diverged in terms of relations between both
parties, with little hope that recent talks to upgrade the customs union would
bring the both parties back again. However, as stated above, the customs union
is only part of the relations between the both parties to help assisting the
eventual accession membership of Turkey into the EU, yet the most vital issue
that can lead to the achievement of this goal is not the customs union or its
revision, but the fulfilment of the political criteria.
References
Chislett,
William, Turkey’s 10 years of EU accession negotiations: no end in
sight,(Madrid: Elcano Royal Institute, 2015), <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/web/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/wp14-2015-chislett-turkeys-10-years-of-eu-accession-negotiations-no-end-in-sight>
Eralp,
Atila, ‘The role of temporality and interaction in the Turkey-EU relationship’,
New Perspectives on Turkey, 40 (2009), pp. 149-170
Müftüler-Baç,
Meltem, ‘Turkey's ambivalent relations with the European Union: To Accede or
not to Accede’, Uluslararası İlişkiler, 13 (2016), pp.89-103
Turhan,
Ebru, ‘Turkey's EU accession process: do member states matter?’, Journal
of Contemporary European Studies, 24 (2016), p.463-477
[1] Atila Eralp, ‘The role of
temporality and interaction in the Turkey-EU relationship’, New Perspectives
on Turkey, 40 (2009), pp. 149-170
[2] Eralp, p. 150
[3] Eralp, p. 164
[4] Ebru Turhan, ‘Turkey's EU
accession process: do member states matter?’, Journal of Contemporary
European Studies, 24 (2016), pp.463-477 (p.469)
[5] Turhan, p. 468
[6] Meltem Müftüler-Baç, ‘Turkey's
ambivalent relations with the European Union: To Accede or not to Accede’, Uluslararası
İlişkiler, 13 (2016), pp.89-103 (p.93)
[7] Müftüler-Baç, p.94
[8] William Chislett, Turkey’s
10 years of EU accession negotiations: no end in sight, (Madrid: Elcano
Royal Institute, 2015), p. 8 < http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/web/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/wp14-2015-chislett-turkeys-10-years-of-eu-accession-negotiations-no-end-in-sight>
[9] Turhan, p. 470 (parenthesis added)
[10] Müftüler-Baç, p.92
[11] Müftüler-Baç, p.97
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