Assad and demographic surgery

I was intending to write this article last year but I got busy and I did not get the chance to work on it until now. Thus, it might seem outdated but the article still discusses the events of the besieged districts of various cities in late 2016, this article employs a new academic term that identifies a type of behaviour in conflict situations, yet though the term is recent the behaviour itself is not new. This article is no sense discriminatory to any group whatsoever, and does not target any group that constitute a part of the Syrian population.

As I watch the situation in Syria getting worse day after day, I asked myself why the Assad regime is recently turning to evacuating the people in various cities like Hama, Hums, Daraya, and recently Aleppo. I would like to refresh your memory first with Assad’s words in a speech he gave in front a group of “religious scholars, in 23rd of April 2014 to be exact, he said the following: “If we started from one truth, that we are in front of tens of thousands of terrorists, I’m not talking about terrorists coming from abroad, I’m talking about terrorists from inside of Syria -children of this society, and when we are talking about thousands of those terrorists this means that we are talking about ‘social couveuse’; there is a family, there is a relative, there is a neighbour, there is a friend, there are other people which means that we are talking about hundreds of thousands or maybe millions of Syrians, and even if it is one million let’s say millions. It might not be a big number, but when we are talking on the national level about one million or more, or hundreds of thousands, in a society of 23 million people this means that we are in front of a case of moral failure, a social failure, and which means, in the end, failure on the national level. So, on who does this failure lie?”[i]
This was the exact words spoken by Assad himself. These words have always remained in my memory the first time I listened to them. What struck me, as a Syrian, was his describing of “hundreds of thousands, or millions” of those Syrians as “terrorists”. This statement clarifies a lot of how Assad views the situation in Syria.
Assad inherited a police state forged by his father, Hafiz Assad, based on extensive security devices, and a coalition of minorities which was based on their loyalty to the police state. What his father did was basically to neutralize any figure that has the potential to stand against him. He injected these minorities, especially the Alawites into the state apparatus particularly in the security devices.
In 1982, an uprising started by the Muslim brotherhood, which culminated with the Hama Massacre. Hafiz besieged the city of Hama for 27 days and the result? An estimate of 10 to 25 thousand deaths, later Friedman wrote the following:
“The Syrian regime of President Hafez al-Assad, which was responsible for carrying out the massacre, did little to dispute these figures or to tidy up Hama before reopening the main highway that ran through it from Damascus in May 1982. am convinced that Assad wanted the Syrian people to see Hama raw, to listen closely to its silence and reflect on its pain”.[ii]
Hafiz was able to use fear as a tool to silence dissent. However, the same recently is being done by his son, Bashar, however not by instilling fear which he tried but did not work with him. Since Bashar cannot do today, what his father did to 20 thousand Syrians, to those “hundreds of thousands, or millions” of terrorist, he resorted to a different strategy. Instead of killing these people, he employs a different tactic; he forces them to evacuate the area so by that he gets rid of any dissent against him in the newly gained territory.
A recent term coined by Ferrara[iii] can help us understand what actually is going on in Syria. Ferrara argues that there are certain events that do not fall under the concept of ethnic-cleansing or genocide, instead there are instances where a people who lived in a certain part of a land are driven out or in another word; forcibly migrate from their homes, and those people are not targeted based on ethnic lines but rather simply out of political calculations. Under such conditions, such events Ferrara describes them as demographic surgeries, he further goes on explaining that:
“Demographic surgery is characterized by its being a policy aimed at whole categories of people that are singled out as “dangerous” or “harmful”; its victims are not persecuted individually, but rather en masse and often on grounds of prevention rather than retribution. Even if the measure is conceived (or justified) as a collective punishment, it is usually administered through executive rather than judicial decisions – a fact that can have significant legal and political implications.”
I came to believe that this is actually what the Assad regime is doing recently. Ferrara in his article gives many historical instances where such actions took place, he gives the example of the Soviet “decossackization” policies in 1919-1920, or the Soviet deportations of the people in the annexed territories during WWI. Similarly, the Assad regime besieges an area and then begins with a process of purification under which the regime forces the population out of the besieged area, this depopulated area is later used to the advantage of the regime by populating the area by people who are supportive to the regime policies.

By this way, the Assad regime seeks to restructure the Syrian society in a way favourable to its policies, this way is less expensive and benefits the regime in the long run had the outcome of the crisis turned in its favour. Using such technique, the regime makes sure that in a future Syria where the regime is still dominant no threat would exist on its territory. However, to argue that such actions indicate the weakness of the regime, I think is not true, a simple reflection on the historical instances given in Ferrara’s paper it can be seen that most of the actors who employed such technique had the upper hand, the ability to carry out such actions requires systematic coordination which is usually lacking in most insurgencies this is specially the case in the Syrian insurgencies where most of them are divided, and each has different political goals.



[i] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ueif2DLx6gw
[ii] Thomas L. Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem, (New York: Picador, 1989), p.77.
[iii]  Antonio Ferrara, Beyond Ethnic Cleansing: Demographic Surgery in European History, IWM, http://www.iwm.at/publications/5-junior-visiting-fellows-conferences/vol-xxix/beyond-ethnic-cleansing-demographic-surgery-in-european-history-1/

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